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# The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and National Integration in Egypt

*Mahmud A. Faksh*

## A. NATIONAL HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION

The beginnings of the modernization process in Egypt date back to the French invasion (1798–1799), which really revolutionized Egyptian thought. It provided the leaders with an opportunity to compare and contrast the two vastly differing cultures: the medieval Muslim and the modern scientific outlook. The old culture was subjected to a severe test, and in response, Egypt undertook a series of changes to modify its traditional culture. It would seem, however, that the most important social change brought about by this contact was the development of modern secular education, introduced during Muhamad Ali's rule (1805–1849), which was vastly different from the already existing religious system of education. The result of this innovation was the creation of an educational system rivalling the traditional religious one but not supplanting it.

This division into two systems of education—the traditional religious and the modern secular—was inevitable as a new way of life was being introduced. The new way of life demanded a special system of education to serve it and perpetuate it; the old way of life continued to maintain its own. Each system served a different clientele and performed a different function. The religious schools continued to provide a rudimentary education for the masses in the form of the three Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic), while the modern government schools provided a secular, European-style education for the existing and aspiring elite.

The split in the education of the nation created a dichotomized and chaotic culture that has persisted to the present.<sup>1</sup> 'The basic conflict in education has prevented a unification of the national culture.'<sup>2</sup> The dual system unquestionably tended to perpetuate differences between social classes by creating an intellectual elite—'the cultured aristocracy'—who monopolized government positions and high-income professions.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the leaders of Egyptian education believed that it helped to breed two distinct mentalities in the people and two ways of thinking, so that in any issue that arises or event that occurs,

the graduate of the Azhar [religious school] conceives it in one sense, while the graduate of the modern schools conceives it in another sense. Thus the two different graduates agree in neither their thinking nor in their evaluation; nor do they agree in judgment and decision; nor in procedure and action.<sup>4</sup>

The problem implicit in this dichotomy of mind or at least of education, is

one to which Ahmad Amin (a leading Egyptian novelist) repeatedly addressed himself in his essays, *Hayati* (My Life). One of the most striking on this theme of intellectual integration of old and new is *al-Halaqat al-Mafqudah* (the Missing Links), in which he pleads for a group of scholars truly at home in both worlds, who would provide a bridge of culture. Those versed in Islam know the Qoran and tradition with meticulous care, but they live in isolation from the problem of the present. By contrast, the modern stream of education makes its products familiar with physics, chemistry, Bergson and Shaw, but they lack Arabic fluency and cannot transmit their learning.<sup>5</sup>

The tension resulting from the cultural gap is particularly acute since the contrast between the traditional Islamic and the modernizing cultures is so marked, and the former, as Malcolm Kerr has observed about Egypt, is not conceded by all its educated members to have been made obsolete by the advent of the latter. Thus 'contact between the two cultures has been one of more bitter and protracted conflict, and has caused much pain, uncertainty, equivocation, and proneness to illusion and emotionalism.'<sup>6</sup>

The struggle between the two ideological orientations—the products of the two educational systems—had considerably influenced the course of political events in twentieth-century Egypt. Egyptian politics after the First World War can be characterized as a triangular struggle for authority among the British, the king, and the parliament. As the instrument for the centralization of authority, parliament was generally supported by the modernists who wished to counteract the influence of the British, to limit the power of the king, and to unite the independent system of religious education with the modern government-controlled system. The active antagonism of the group of *ulama* to any change in the status quo turned al-Azhar into a royalist bastion. This alliance between the throne and al-Azhar had deepened the split between the modernists and traditionalists and thus isolated al-Azhar from the nationalist movement toward secularism.

An indication of the failure of the different modernizers to reform al-Azhar as an educational institution and how, in turn, they turned to work their way around al-Azhar and religious questions was that Muhammad Ali preferred to introduce an entirely new school system rather than institute reform at al-Azhar. Khedive Ismail likewise created *Dar al-Ulum* to avoid any direct confrontation with religious leaders over reforms within the religious system of education. 'The old is never destroyed; it is simply allowed to lapse into disuse.'<sup>7</sup>

It appears, then, that the revolutionary officers inherited a nation deeply split over modernist and traditionalist orientations, an unreformed Azhar, and a religious class which was desperately trying to defend its crumbling position while refusing to participate in the modernization of Egyptian life and thought.<sup>8</sup> In his study of the role of education in nation-building, Trevor Coombe maintains that

since religious leadership in those countries is created by an entirely separate and self-perpetuating system of education, it will presumably require fundamental changes in the nature of the religious institutions

themselves before the fissure between the traditional-sacred and modernizing-secular world is closed.<sup>9</sup>

This was precisely what the young officers tried to accomplish. The revolution has sought to achieve cultural unity no less than political unity, for it has perceived the necessity of social and cultural transformation on the way to political revolution. A law passed in June, 1961, provided for the conversion of al-Azhar into a modern-style university offering degrees in the full range of scientific and humanistic secular disciplines alongside those of Islamic law and theology. It totally integrated the religious system of education with the government's modern system. 'In a word, al-Azhar has been nationalized.'<sup>10</sup> How rapidly and effectively it will substantially affect and change the training and outlook of students in the traditional field to forge a cultural unity remains to be seen.

Malcolm Kerr maintains that there are limits to the adaptability of a traditional institution such as al-Azhar, which has acquired high visibility and great respect, to a modern national educational system. The cultural gap between the educational patterns in the different spheres of the dual system inevitably means that the graduates of the traditional institutions have a competitive disadvantage in the modern sector of society.<sup>11</sup> Recent studies on the impact of secularization on the religious institutions in general and on al-Azhar in particular have shown the failure of reforms to have the desired effect upon the traditional core of religious studies within the university or upon the *ulama*.<sup>12</sup> The course of secularization in modern Egypt is still far from complete.<sup>13</sup>

Religious education remains an important means of social advancement for lower-class persons, but government control over the curriculum, over career placement, over financial resources, and over placement in high religious positions is rendering the whole religious institution but an adjunct of state administration. In spite of all this, however, the fact remains that in many ways those studying in religious schools and those who call themselves *ulama* are still predominantly traditional in their manner and dress, in values and beliefs, and in social behaviour. Indeed, al-Azhar and its affiliates continue to produce men who are largely out of touch with the problems of modern Egyptian life and useless for the modern sector.

The educational division of al-Azhar, in cooperation with voluntary groups, maintains about three hundred Qoranic (religious) schools in the provinces.<sup>14</sup> In 1968–1969 the total number of those enrolled in the primary and secondary levels of al-Azhar affiliates was 69,676, in comparison to the total number of 13,587, enrolled in the same year in industrial, commercial, and agricultural technical institutes.<sup>15</sup> These are traditional schools for higher religious studies. Hence, a fair number of these students are not nearly as prepared for what they will find in Cairo as the regular preparatory school students are.<sup>16</sup>

Further efforts have been made to correct the existing maladies in Egyptian society and culture, and to forge national unity. These were mainly reflected in a considerable educational expansion at all levels of the modern system of education. This actual physical expansion of the educational

opportunities in Egypt since the revolution has been very impressive indeed. In 1952 only 45 per cent of children of primary school age attended school. By 1960 the proportion had risen to 65 per cent; 80 per cent for boys and 50 per cent for girls.<sup>17</sup> By 1967, with a total enrollment of 3.4 million, it represented 80 per cent of the eligible children.<sup>18</sup> The expansion of the school system has been limited in recent years by the fact that Egypt has given budget priority to other areas of activity, such as the Aswan Dam and armaments. Thus by 1970–1971 the school population was 3.7 million.<sup>19</sup> Also, school construction has lagged behind the birth rate, which is one of the highest in the world. Most primary schools, particularly those in the cities, are already operating with two shifts of pupils to increase their capacity.

There has also been a moderate increase in enrollment in technical secondary schools. This is in line with the revolutionary government's general programme of economic development and industrialization of the country. The data presented in Table 1 leave no doubt that since the 1952 revolution one of the chief targets in the field of education has been the expansion in technical training at all levels. The percentage of average increase at vocational secondary schools between 1953–1954 and 1965–1966 is almost four times as much as at the general secondary level.

TABLE 1  
STUDENT ENROLLMENT IN DIFFERENT EDUCATION LEVELS,  
1953–1954 AND 1965–1966

Level of Education	Enrollment (Thousands)		Percentage of Average Increase
	1953–1954	1965–1966	
Primary	1,393	3,418	145
General preparatory	349	574	65
Vocational preparatory	3	27	800
General secondary	92	209	127
Vocational secondary	19	101	432
Teachers institutes	24	49	104
Universities	54	124	130
Total	1,934	4,502	132

Source: U. A. R., Central Agency of Public Mobilization & Statistics, *Population Increase in the U. A. R. and its deterrent to Development*, (Cairo, 1966), In Arabic, 190.

The fact remains, however, that students have continued to favour general secondary education because it is the stepping-stone to a prestigious university degree. In 1970–1971, technical secondary education enrollment reached about 270,000 compared with a total general secondary school enrollment of almost 300,000 students.<sup>20</sup> Accordingly, the most impressive

facet of the expansion of higher education in Egypt has been in the university student enrollment, which rose from 35,016 undergraduates (excluding al-Azhar and the American University) in 1951–1952 to 86,539 in 1960–1961.<sup>21</sup> It rose to 152,382 in 1970–1971.<sup>22</sup>

The rapid expansion of higher education, particularly after the revolution, has been due to several factors. First, an obsessive desire has emerged of young people in every class of Egyptian society for higher education. A second factor relates to government policy, which in response to public pressure enhanced the expansion in liberal arts, law, and commerce. Further, in order to meet the needs of the country for trained specialists, it promoted increased enrollment in science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine. The need for such trained technical persons has become progressively greater in recent years as a result of the heightened trend toward industrialization. Thirdly, the rapid expansion in university enrollment has been influenced by the democratization of education in the sense that financial barriers no longer represent a serious obstacle to those who are seriously interested in obtaining a university education. After a gradual reduction in tuition fees, extensive exemptions, and generous financial aid, a presidential decree in July 1962 made all higher education entirely free. Financial assistance for living expenses is also provided to needy students as well as the superior ones as a recognition of excellence.

But did the expansion of educational opportunities at all levels of the educational system succeed in bridging the gap between the modern educated few and the traditional uneducated many and thus contribute to national integration? Manfred Halpern recognizes the magnitude and complexity of the problem in its different dimensions by stating that ‘no rulers of the Middle East ever attempted to mobilize so large a mass whose view of the world was so different from their own.’<sup>23</sup>

Before the 1952 revolution, the modern system of education of the government type and of the foreign type was ‘elitist’ in the sense that it continued to provide education to the children of the Western-educated middle and upper-class Egyptians. Fees were not abolished in primary schools until 1944, and in high schools until 1951. Consequently the gap separating the educated young Egyptians from the illiterate masses of the people grew wider. The ‘modernized sensibilities’ of the educated people differentiated them from the masses of their countrymen who stood as staunch supporters of traditionalism and conservatism.<sup>24</sup>

The special character of this social imbalance has become so deep that it has produced profound obstacles to both national mobilization and social reconstruction. The ensuing split in outlook and approach toward the basic issues confronting the Egyptian polity divided the elite internally and reduced its capacity for joint harmonious action to solve the growing economic and social problems facing the nation. This becomes apparent in the zig-zag form of Egyptian politics which moved in the direction of different ‘system-challenging’ organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Young Egypt movement, the Communist party, the Ruwwad movement, to the numerous efforts to reinvigorate the dominant Wafd party leadership, to the formation of the Free Officers movement, and to the

near-collapse of the old régime upon the burning of Cairo in January, 1952, and finally, six months later, to Nasser's military coup.

TABLE 2  
FOREIGN SCHOOLS' ENROLLMENT AND THE PROPORTION  
OF EGYPTIAN STUDENTS, 1942-1943

<i>Kind of School</i>	<i>Total Enrollment</i>	<i>Number of Egyptians</i>
American	8,719	8,073
French	30,259	23,053
English	9,239	5,522
Italian	8,757	4,518
Greek	9,973	512

Source: Roderic D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi, *Education in the Arab Countries of The Near East* (American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1949), 113.

Since 1952 the expansion of mass education has contributed significantly to the unification of cultural life in the country by proportionately decreasing foreign schools' graduates to a much smaller number than before. After the Suez crisis of 1956 most foreign schools and colleges have either been nationalized or put under tight state control and forced to change their curriculum to conform with the government system. Before the revolution the foreign schools produced the privileged social and cultural elite in Egypt. Table 2 shows the proportion of Egyptians enrolled in these schools in the year 1942-1943. Egyptian boys and girls who attended them could usually neither read nor write Arabic. Furthermore, it was to a large extent the minority communities—Copts, Jews, Syrians, and Lebanese, as well as Greeks and Italians—and the Egyptian upper class whose children attended these schools and who felt no sympathy for the great mass of their fellow countrymen. They were best qualified upon graduation to fill key commercial jobs in the cities requiring fluency in foreign languages. It is not surprising, therefore, that the revolutionary regime regarded such schools as breeding grounds for one of Egypt's social evils, its irresponsible aristocracy.

A careful examination of the expansion of educational opportunities, however, would reveal that the resulting increase in school enrollment is largely meaningless. This is due to the low standards resulting from inadequate physical and human resources, a rapid population growth, and a war-burdened economy, which have combined to frustrate all efforts to eliminate illiteracy. In 1950 a UNESCO report estimated the Egyptian population over seven years old to be 90 per cent illiterate. In 1956 the proportion was still about 82 per cent illiterate.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, in spite of all efforts to reduce the illiteracy rate, especially among males, in absolute terms the number of people who cannot read or write has continued to increase, as shown in Table 3. In a recent series of articles on education,

Lewis Awad, a Copt who is a literary editor of *al-Ahram*, showed that seventy-five per cent of the people of Egypt are still illiterate—almost the same percentage as during the last years of the monarchy.<sup>26</sup>

TABLE 3  
ILLITERACY TRENDS IN EGYPT, BY SEX: 1907–1960

	Total Persons Aged 10 and over	Persons Not Able to Read and Write Aged 10 and over	Illiteracy Rate		Total
			Male	Female	
1907	7,848,024	7,277,303	87.0	98.6	92.7
1917	9,161,944	8,357,461	84.8	97.7	91.2
1927	10,268,404	8,816,601	76.1	95.6	85.9
1937	11,603,488	9,885,300	76.6	93.9	85.2
1947	13,489,946	10,407,972	66.1	88.2	77.2
1960	17,914,323	12,587,686	56.6	83.8	70.3

Source: Donald C. Mead, *Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy*, (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), Statistical Appendix 301, Table 11–A–6.

Thus, the fact remains that despite all these efforts since 1952, the educational system in Egypt remains inadequate to the regime's requirements. Egypt's high illiteracy rate accounts for the predominance of traditional cultural beliefs and practices which could still block the flow of integrative sentiments toward the nation and the elite. Daniel Lerner asserts that those without 'a usable literacy' tend to remain traditional, whereas those with literacy tend to exert themselves to gain access to modernity.<sup>27</sup> Edward Shils goes further, to say that illiteracy greatly restricts not only the range of knowledge of the world beyond national boundaries, but even beyond narrow local boundaries, which, in turn, causes estrangement and impedes the growth of the sense of membership in that national community.<sup>28</sup>

Accompanying this high illiteracy rate, the great stress laid on university education has served to perpetuate the imbalances in the different levels of the educational system and, in effect, to exacerbate the wide cleavage separating the illiterate masses from a highly educated group at the other extreme. Between 1953–1954 and 1961–1962, the budget of the universities has almost quadrupled, whereas the budget of the Ministry of Education little more than doubled.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, the secularization of the masses remains the great unfinished business in Egypt.

This dichotomy in Egyptian society and culture which attests to the poor integration of the Egyptian polity is reflected clearly in the political culture of the educated Egyptians. It is a culture marked by a crisis of identity, ambivalence of attitudes, values, and beliefs not only toward the traditional order of society, but also toward the new national order and the elite. This reveals something of the complexity of present-day political and social attitudes that are sometimes encountered among educated Egyptians.<sup>30</sup>



This ambivalence is most clearly shown in a study of the character of nationalism among the Egyptian professionals based on data gathered from interviews with one hundred and ten Egyptian professionals conducted by the Bureau of Applied Research of Columbia University during the spring and summer of 1951. The picture of nationalism that emerges from these interviews is a complex one having many features of ambivalence. The complicated character of the nationalistic attitudes of the professionals is derived from the ambivalent situation in which they found themselves. On the one hand, they were strongly oriented toward the West and Western culture; on the other hand, they felt that they were rejected by the West—scorned, unappreciated, and ‘occupied’. In this situation of ambivalence, their nationalism was indecisive in character.<sup>31</sup> ‘Uncertainty as to their identity, their function, their future obscured clear vision of themselves in the future world and increased their remoteness from the Egyptian masses.’<sup>32</sup>

This lack of a clear-cut and straightforward perspective of political nationalism and the consequent lack of a clear vision of Egypt’s national problems among the educated was a severe handicap to Nasser. Indeed, it was disagreement and disillusionment with civilian politicians and administrators over the extent and pace of reform that prompted the military officers to stay in power and, subsequently, recruit ‘trustworthy men’ (i.e., officers) rather than ‘experts’ (i.e., civilians) for responsible positions in the government. Upon consulting Egypt’s experienced leaders, ‘we were not able to obtain very much’, comments Nasser. He goes on to say: ‘Every man we questioned had nothing to recommend except to kill someone else.’<sup>33</sup> The Free Officers who originally wanted to avoid any political involvement discovered that their socio-economic choices, such as land reform, nationalization, and the general ideological trend of the regime, entailed political choice. In particular, the direction of the new order was to be entrusted to the loyal members of the military junta rather than the educated elite.

The army officers who are ‘in’ have monopolized power and deprived the educated ‘experts’ who are ‘out’ of the right to free self-expression. This has alienated the educated and strengthened what Shils calls the ‘anti-political politics’, the ‘politics of withdrawal’,<sup>34</sup> that has been growing among Egypt’s educated elite. The whole picture of this half-hearted, indecisive relationship between the officers and the educated can be more readily seen in the ‘participation crisis’ which characterizes the pattern of political life among the educated in Egypt.

#### B. NATIONAL VERTICAL INTEGRATION: EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

To look at the problem of political participation among educated Egyptians and the ensuing ‘crisis of participation’ in a proper perspective, I shall address myself to the following question: Did education actually lead to a wider-spread participation in the political process in such a way as to bridge the gap separating the rulers from the ruled and thus attain a certain measure of vertical integration on the way to political development?

The literature on education and political participation has widely documented research findings that participation in political activities increases as the educational level of respondents rises. Among the various demographic variables usually investigated in social science research—*income, occupation, sex, age, place of residence*—education has been found to have the greatest effect on political behaviour. Obviously, the educated person is a different kind of political actor than the person who has little or no education at all.<sup>35</sup>

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have done considerable research on the relationship between education and political participation. According to their five-nations study, there is a positive relationship between education and political participation that holds true in all of the five nations.<sup>36</sup> Because formal schooling is very strongly related to political attitudes, Almond and Verba believe that education provides the shortest route toward the creation of a modern political culture. One of the greatest advantages of education is that 'skills that may take years to develop for the first time can be passed on much more easily once there are some who possess them.' Education can equip persons to gather information about government and politics; it can impart the skills of political participation. Therefore, Almond and Verba called education 'the most obvious substitute for time.'<sup>37</sup>

In studying the effects of the spread of education in Nigeria, David Abernathy reached the conclusion that 'education has the dual effect of raising personal ambitions and furthering awareness of politics.'<sup>38</sup> In more general terms, Karl Deutsch observes that 'social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population.'<sup>39</sup>

But the issue of central concern here is whether the educated people in Egypt do effectively participate in the political process. In order to explore this problem, it is essential to analyse the inner dynamics of political life in Egypt today.

In general, the 1952 revolutionary regime has sought to increase the participation of the masses, whom it intended to benefit but who made few concrete demands other than that their government be a Muslim-Egyptian government. It has also sought to limit the political participation of the urban-educated elite which was likely to make the greatest demands: 'the educated Egyptian cannot participate in government; he can only respond to it, and that response must be more or less favorable.'<sup>40</sup> This has precipitated a 'participation crisis' that characterizes the pattern of political life among the educated in Egypt today.

The realities of political life in Egypt today may be characterized as administrative-oligarchic in nature. Nothing really significant goes on in Egypt which is not the result of some action by the governing inner circle comprising a hard core military-technocratic elite.<sup>41</sup> This, in turn, would frustrate any desire to participate on the part of the average member of the educated class in Egypt. The absence of opportunity to participate renders the government a relatively distant, cold object no matter how much the leaders appear psychologically familiar and warm. Thus 'political support from the regime, while not deficient, is generally passive.'<sup>42</sup>

This interpretation suggests that the participation crisis in Egypt is at

present invisible or suppressed. That there is no open pressure for increased participation and that only the most harmless of private murmuring goes on is certainly the case. It would appear that many recent graduates in Egypt are not engrossedly concerned with political participation. This is in sharp contrast to the pre-revolutionary situation.

Before 1952, students organized along the lines of political parties, both officially recognized and not. Student political organizations were training grounds for a future political career and also a means of winning a claim to future employment should the party of one's choice obtain a certain measure of power.

Under the revolutionary regime, there is only one policy, and everyone is expected to accommodate himself to that policy. Members of the educated classes may dutifully play their part, when they are called upon, in the various government organizations, such as the National Union or its successor, the Arab Socialist Union. Beyond this, however, they tend to do and say what is expected of them.

Indeed, the oligarchic, clique-like structure and centralized character of the revolutionary regime are most apparent in the disparity between the actual political dominance of the army and the intended civilian participation in the government by the National Union or the Arab Socialist Union. The National Union or its successor, the Arab Socialist Union, have been subordinated to secondary roles with hardly any real participation in the political process. At best, it serves to mobilize the enthusiastic support of a politically impotent populace. The army, on the other hand, is the preponderant force of political power in the country. The new men not only seized political leadership, but also penetrated almost every key position in the state. This has led one Egyptian leftist to argue to the effect that Egypt is a 'military society'.<sup>43</sup>

The determination of the military junta to become the ruling elite in the country precluded any long-range alliances with rival groups. Its political interest—the desire to rule in order to carry out the revolution—could not have been reconciled with other group interests. As such, the Free Officers became the nucleus of a new ruling class whose membership continued to be recruited largely from the army officer corps, but which was slowly invaded by certain professional groups in Egyptian society with whose services the military power could not dispense or easily replace.<sup>44</sup>

Indeed, under the revolutionary regime the essential socialization role played by the existing educational system in Egypt supports this pattern of passive, non-participatory political life among the educated Egyptians. In general, educational practices still emphasise the authority of the teacher, memorisation, formal curricula, strict uniformity, discipline, and routine, despite some reports of newer but marginal influences penetrating the system. In the primary and preparatory schools strong efforts are directed toward developing a strong loyalty to the regime. Here the students are repeatedly taught the various patriotic themes of Islam, nationalism, Arabism, and socialism. Textbooks are full of stories about the glory of medieval Islamic heroes and the great Arab nationalist struggle against colonialism and other political and socio-economic injustices that culminated

in the 1952 revolution. Many pages are given over to Qoranic passages and sayings of the prophet on ethics. This overt and general pattern of socialization might on frequent occasions take the form of celebrating Port Said Day (the evacuation of the British and French troops in 1956), or Palestine Refugee Day, or any other nationalistic event.

Based on my own experience with this kind of socialization I underwent in my primary, preparatory, and secondary school years, it would be safe to assume that such ceaseless efforts to bring about an identification with the regime have been somewhat successful. My classmates and I developed a strong sense of identification and pride with Arabism, anti-colonialism, and nationalist leaders of Nasser's calibre. On different occasions, as the government deemed it necessary, we were able to express these feelings and attitudes by demonstrating in support of regime causes and against anti-regime causes, domestic or foreign.

At the university level, this overt socialization process takes the form of advanced ideological indoctrination that is manifest in the curriculum of the faculty of politics and economics, and other courses on 'National Subjects'—*al-Mawad al-Qawmiyyah*—such as 'Arab Society', 'The July 23 Revolution', and 'Socialism', required for all students. This indoctrination presents Egypt as its leaders and people would like to see it: proud, independent, strong, and successful in meeting present and future challenges and achieving national goals. Moreover, the general national framework of these features extends to the whole Arab world. As a result, students have been prepared to forego their individual ideologies for the sake of the national goals, and the universities have been consequently emptied of their spirit. Indeed, Egyptian students have always been motivated by national aims.

In addition to these processes, the students have come to recognize those accomplishments of the revolution that have produced some benefits. The large expansion of the higher educational system, the very low tuition, and financial aid have widened opportunities for a large number of students who might not have received a university education under the old regime. Moreover, the dramatic achievements of the late President Nasser during and after 1955 left the students, like most Egyptians and Arabs, in a euphoric of pride and contentment. R. H. Dekmejian maintains that 'as a socialising agent, the charismatic leader's role in the re-socialising process seemed to be decisive'.<sup>45</sup>

At this stage, however, the more covert and specific socialisation begins. It is here where the student is first introduced to the inner workings of a bureaucratic atmosphere—the way in which the university is organized under the revolutionary regime, the career prospects and influence of each field of specialization, and the relationship of 'organised' and 'controlled' extra-curricular activities for his career advancement.<sup>46</sup>

The student will soon learn that the higher institutes with their more practical training have better career prospects and thus enjoy a higher prestige and security, whereas graduates of the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Law have been waiting almost three years to be placed. They find out that the military ruling elite has not much respect for professorial and academic types, and that students themselves are somewhat suspect and subject at

certain occasions to special praise. They come to realise the important role of the security officer assigned to the university by the Ministry of the Interior, and the subordinate administrative authority of their teachers. The power of the Ministry of Education becomes more evident after a time, and the student becomes aware of its control over student organizations as well as its connections with the High Council on Youth Welfare, which is partly responsible for the indoctrination and for demonstrating the loyalty of the university.<sup>47</sup>

Through the four or more years of his university education the student becomes acquainted with the inner mechanics of a bureaucratic structure in which he will try to find a place to serve for the rest of his working life. He takes a close look at the manner in which those with 'real' political power behave, how those with cultural attainments behave, and how those with petty administrative positions behave. If he is wise enough, he will come to understand where his station is in the 'democratic' Egyptian Arab Republic.

Leonard Binder states succinctly:

Imperfect a system though it may be, the university performs a very important socializing function for the administrative elite of the country. As they learned about the overt character of the political system and its ideal goals in grammar school, they learn about its internal workings, the flow of authority, prestige, and permitted deviations during their higher education.<sup>48</sup>

The process of overt and covert socialization has to a great degree successfully denied the students the possibility of taking the initiative to act as an independent body, and, except for the February–November 1968 demonstration over the lenient sentence against the Army and Air Force commanders who were charged with responsibility for the military defeat in 1967, they have been transformed into a massive crowd of regimented individuals, devoid of their former concern with political participation. Whereas in former regimes educated Egyptians found an outlet for their disappointments with reality by adopting new ideologies and system-challenging movements from outside the regime, such as the Muslim Brotherhood religious reactionaries, Young Egypt fascist-type nationalists, and Communists, under the revolutionary regime students are imbued with a single ideology which appears to them morally and practically complete, and they have no reason to reject it. Students are given the opportunity to express themselves in the institutions of the Arab Socialist Union–Egypt's only political party; they are not, however, given the possibility of independent action but have to operate in cooperation with other groups' representatives within the party's organization. Coupled with this is a general feeling of frustration and despair among the educated arising from the impression that they have no role to play in revolutionary Egypt and that society has no need for them. The resulting perplexity of the educated Egyptians has, in most cases, led to political passiveness and frustration.

## NOTES

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